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Abstract: Although major advances have been made in relation to explaining the supply side of
the informal economy, this is not the case for the demand-side of the informal economy. This study
analyses for the first time the purchasers of undeclared goods and services in the healthcare sector. To
evaluate the purchase of undeclared healthcare goods and services, logistic regression analysis and
robustness tests are used on 3048 interviews in Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta. The finding is that an
important share of the purchasers make this type of purchase unknowingly. However, no difference
in terms of socio-economics characteristics of those who knowingly and those who unknowingly
made purchases of undeclared healthcare goods and services was identified. Meanwhile a significant
influence of trust (in government and in other citizens) has been identified in relation to those
who made these purchases knowingly. As such, policy measures aimed at decreasing unknowing
purchases and at nurturing trust are discussed in the concluding section.
Keywords: undeclared healthcare goods and services; informal economy; horizontal trust; vertical
trust; consumer behaviour
1. Introduction
Over the past few decades, many studies have sought to understand and explain
participation in the informal economy. Although major advances have been made, this
has mostly been in relation to explaining the supply side of the informal economy or the
providers of informal goods and services [1,2]. Despite some 60% of the global workforce
having their main employment in the informal economy [3,4], displaying that the informal
economy is a large segment of global production and consumption, few have analysed who
makes purchases of undeclared goods and services (i.e., the demand side of the informal
economy) and why they do so. There are only a few notable exceptions [5–10]. Even
fewer studies have evaluated the motives driving individuals to make purchases from
the informal economy, including whether individuals are sometimes unaware that they
are purchasing from the informal economy [11,12]. Although corruption and informal
practices in the healthcare sector are well documented, no previous study has investigated
who make purchases of undeclared healthcare goods and services and why they do so.
Instead, in the healthcare sector, the focus has been upon the supply side, focusing upon
explaining, for example, corruption in procurements [13,14] or informal payments to
healthcare practitioners [15–20]. As such, studies have not evaluated the purchaser of
undeclared healthcare goods and services and sought to explain whether they do so
knowingly or not, and from whom they make such purchases.
To fill this significant gap, this study analyses for the first time the purchasers of
undeclared goods and services in the healthcare sector. The paper‘s novelty is twofold.
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Firstly, unlike the previous studies on the demand side of the informal economy, this study
accounts for both categories of motives that can drive consumers to informal economy,
namely whether they do so knowingly or unknowingly. Secondly, this is the first paper that
seeks to evaluate the influence of both types of trust (i.e., vertical or the trust that citizens
have in their government and horizontal trust or the trust that citizens have in their fellow
citizens) in purchasing healthcare goods and services. These issues have been found to
be significant in relation to the supply side of informal economy (i.e., those providing the
undeclared goods and services) and we here propose to test their validity in terms of the
demand side of the informal economy.
Indeed, when explaining those providing the undeclared goods and services, two
main groups have been identified, namely those who use this strategy for survival, having
no other choice (“exclusion” or “marginalization” thesis) [21–23] and those who choose to
engage in informal economy (“exit” or “reinforcement” thesis) for various reasons ranging
from avoiding burdensome regulations to meeting social ends [24–27]. When analysing the
supply side of the informal economy in the European Union member states, the finding
is that there is indeed a dual informal labour market and that the socio-economic charac-
teristics of the exclusion- and exit-driven informal workers differ. The exclusion-driven
“lower-tier” of the informal economy is more likely to be composed of the unemployed
and workers in East-Central Europe, whilst the exit-driven “upper tier” is more likely to be
formed by those with few financial difficulties and workers in Nordic nations [28]. In rela-
tion to the demand-side of the informal economy, no previous study has investigated the
socio-demographic characteristics of those who purchase undeclared goods and services
(in general or in healthcare sector) and whether a similar dual market exists between those
who purchase on a knowing basis against those who make such purchases unknowingly.
However, previous literature has identified that there are some socio-demographic varia-
tions in relation to various knowing motivations, such as seeking a lower price, seeking
a faster or better service, having no choice due to the lack of availability on the formal
market, or seeking social ends [5,7–12]. As such, we propose the following hypothesis to
be tested:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The socio-demographic profile of the purchaser varies according to the dif-
ferent drivers that determine the purchase of healthcare goods and services (knowing purchase vs.
unknowing purchase).
Similarly, based on studies on the supply side of the informal economy, this paper
seeks to evaluate whether the level of trust that citizens display has any influence on
the decision to purchase undeclared healthcare goods and services. Previous literature
revealed that both types of trust, namely vertical trust (between the citizens and the
government) and horizontal trust (between citizens), are significantly associated with
participation on the supply side of the informal economy. As such, when there is a low
trust in the government or a low trust that other citizens will behave in a compliant
manner, there is a higher likelihood that the individuals will engage themselves in a non-
compliant behaviour [29,30]. Indeed, previous research shows how social norms inform
the individuals on others‘ behaviour which, in turn shape their own behaviour [31–35]. The
limited evidence so far available on the demand-side of the informal economy similarly
finds an association between trust and the purchase of undeclared goods and services [6,8].
Thus, we propose to test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The higher the level of vertical trust the lower is the propensity to buy
undeclared healthcare goods and services;
Hypothesis 3 (H3). The higher the level of horizontal trust the lower is the propensity to buy
undeclared healthcare goods and services.
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To ensure a nuanced understanding of the effect of trust on the purchase of healthcare
goods and services, we test these hypotheses in turn for all healthcare purchases from the
informal economy, for knowing purchases and for unknowing purchases. In order to do
so, we here selected as a case study the four countries in the European Union where this
practice is the most prevalent and, as such, enables valid statistical analysis.
The next section will present the materials and methods employed for testing the
proposed hypotheses. This section is followed by a presentation of the findings. Finally,
the paper discusses the findings and advances the conclusions.
2. Materials and Methods
To test the validity of the proposed hypotheses, we here investigate the purchase of
undeclared healthcare goods and services in four countries in Southern Europe, namely
Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta. These countries are member states of the European Union
and were selected based on the high prevalence of informal purchases of healthcare services.
Indeed, 13% of citizens in Malta, 9% in Cyprus, 7% in Greece and 2% in Italy declared
that they have paid for health services which were not registered for tax purposes in the
last 12 months prior to survey, making the selected countries included in the analysis the
countries with the highest rates of purchase of undeclared healthcare goods and services
amongst European member states. Therefore, the high number of positive outcomes in the
selected countries (i.e., individuals declaring that they paid for undeclared healthcare goods
and services) enabled the statistical data analysis. Data used were extracted from Special
Eurobarometer no. 498 on undeclared work, as part of Eurobarometer Wave 92.1 [36]. The
fieldwork conducted in September 2019 involved 3048 face-to-face interviews in Cyprus,
Greece, Italy and Malta, with individuals over 15 years old. In each of the four countries
selected for analytical purposes, a random-probability multi-stage sample design was
employed. Sampling points were drawn to cover the analysed territories at NUTS II level
(Eurostat’s Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics). The sample in each country
matches the universe of the population in terms of region of residence, urbanization, gender
and age (for details about the data used, see [37]).
Although the Special Eurobarometer survey no. 498 covered various issues on the
supply and demand side of undeclared work, we here confine the discussion to the pur-
chase of undeclared healthcare goods and services. A dummy variable was created with
coded value 1 for those citizens who declared that they had paid for undeclared healthcare
goods and services (e.g., because there was no Value Added Tax (VAT) receipt, no invoice)
and value 0 for those who had not paid for such services in the last 12 months prior to
the survey. Moreover, based on the motives of purchasing healthcare services undeclared
instead of purchasing them from the regular market, two dummy variables were similarly
created to evaluate those citizens buying these services knowing or unknowing. As such,
a dummy variable with coded value 1 was created if individuals purchased undeclared
healthcare goods and services knowingly, and a dummy variable with coded value 0 was
created for those individuals who purchased unknowingly undeclared healthcare goods
and services.
To evaluate whether there is an association between vertical trust and the propensity to
purchase undeclared healthcare goods and services, a composite index measuring the level
of tax morale among citizens is here constructed. Indeed, vertical trust or trust in public
authorities is frequently associated with tax morale (for a review on the matter see [38]),
the latter being used as a proxy for evaluating vertical trust [29,39]. The tax morale index is
here constructed by evaluating the acceptability of five tax evasion behaviours on a scale
between 1 and 10. The questions in the survey used value 1 for totally unacceptable and
10 for totally acceptable. However, when computing the index, for easier interpreting the
findings, we have used a reverse scale. The higher the index value the greater the tax
morale, the higher the vertical trust (trust in authorities).
To evaluate whether there is an association between the horizontal trust and the
propensity to purchase undeclared healthcare goods and services we here used the per-
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ceived estimated share of the population engaged in undeclared activities in the analysed
country. Similar to other studies investigating informal economy [8,30,40–42], corruption,
informal payments and fraud in healthcare [13,14,19,20,43–46], we also used individual-
level control variables related to the socio-demographic profile of the patient buying
undeclared healthcare goods and services (e.g., gender, age, education, household size,
employment status, financial status and country of residence).
Considering the dichotomous variables used as dependent variables, we employed
logistic regressions. While sampling weights were used for the descriptive statistics as
recommended in the wider literature [47,48] and in the Eurobarometer technical specifica-
tions [37], for the logistic regressions various estimations with and without the sampling
weighting scheme were computed, reflecting the debate in the literature over using such
weights in the multivariate analyses [47]. As such, we firstly conducted a logistic regression
analysis without sampling weights for all three dependent variables and secondly, we
conducted a logistic regression analysis with sampling weights. Third and finally, using
multiple imputations missing values were replaced and a logistic regression analysis is
conducted by using imputed data. All these estimations were performed to further test
and to show the robustness of the findings obtained. In addition, to provide a visual view
and help interpret the findings, marginal effects and adjusted predicted probability of
purchasing undeclared healthcare goods and services by the level of vertical and horizontal
trust are displayed. All findings are reported in the next section.
3. Results
Starting with an overview of the tendency to purchase undeclared healthcare goods
and services, Table 1 reveals the share of individuals doing so in the 12 months prior to
the survey and their motives. As such, in 2019, 13% of citizens in Malta, 9% in Cyprus,
7% in Greece and 2% in Italy reported that they paid for undeclared healthcare goods
and services. However, these figures should be treated as lower bound estimates, since
we report the results as a percentage of the total population. This is because only some
citizens needed healthcare services in the last 12 months prior to the survey and therefore
could have paid for this kind of service. For instance, in a study reporting the results of
a Eurobarometer survey on the use of healthcare services, out of 27,786 respondents at
European Union level, only 21,121 had visited a physician or medical institution in the past
12 months [19]. As such, the share of patients paying for undeclared healthcare goods and
services will be larger.
Table 1. Undeclared healthcare goods and services by buying reasons and country (%; n = 2953).












Social Ends Unavailable (2)
Cyprus 9 65 57 41 41 16 20
Greece 7 80 69 24 31 16 9
Italy 2 58 50 8 42 8 46
Malta 13 41 33 4 5 3 67
Notes: (1) multiple answers possible; other reason, refusal, and do not know are not displayed; (2) service unavailable/difficult to find on
regular market. Source: author’s estimations based on data extracted from Special Eurobarometer 498.
Turning to the motives for buying these undeclared services, Table 1 also reveals the
share of those who do this knowingly or unknowingly (multiple answers were possible).
Therefore, out of those buying undeclared healthcare goods and services in Greece, 80% did
so knowingly and only 9% unknowingly. Similarly, in Cyprus, 65% did so knowingly and
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only 20% unknowingly. In sharp contrast, only 41% of those buying undeclared healthcare
goods and services in Malta did so knowingly and 67% unknowingly.
Exploring the reasons to knowingly pay for undeclared healthcare goods and services,
the finding is that in the four analysed countries, the most frequently invoked reasons are
the lower price and doing a favour for someone or helping someone in need of money.
As such, Table 1 reveals that when paying knowingly for undeclared healthcare goods
and services, a lower price is the main reason for doing so (reason cited by 69% of those
buying these kinds of services in Greece, 57% in Cyprus, 50% in Italy and 33% in Malta),
followed by social ends (42% in Italy, 41% in Cyprus, 31% in Greece and 5% in Malta).
This rarely happens because the healthcare service is unavailable or difficult to find on the
regular market.
To evaluate whether these undeclared healthcare goods and services are bought more
often from private persons or healthcare institutions (public or private), Table 2 reports the
variations by the provider of this service. This reveals that overall, undeclared healthcare
goods and services are bought from private persons (other than those close to the patient
(71% of those buying undeclared healthcare goods and services), firms or businesses
in the health sector (35%), known private persons (e.g., friends, neighbours, colleagues,
relatives; 27%) and public service providers (16%). However, no matter the provider of the
undeclared service, this involves major implications for public health. The use of public
office for private gain (i.e., corruption), fiscal fraud by firms or businesses in the health
sector (including employee fraud) and undeclared work or fiscal fraud by private persons
all negatively affect the resource allocation in healthcare (inefficient use of resources),
healthcare access and quality, patient rights and protection [49–52].
Table 2. Undeclared healthcare goods and services by provider (%; n = 209).
















Total 27 71 35 16
Of which (1):
Knowing 37 75 28 16
Lower price 41 73 31 17
Faster/Better 62 52 54 43
Social ends 37 77 19 11
Unavailable (2) 38 75 49 35
Unknowing 3 66 54 21
Notes: (1) multiple answers possible; other reason/provider, refusal and do not know are not displayed; (2) service
unavailable/difficult to find on regular market. Source: author’s estimations based on data extracted from Special
Eurobarometer 498.
There are also differences in terms of the provider of undeclared services according to
whether the acquisition process is knowing or unknowing. As such, according to data in
Table 2, those buying knowingly undeclared healthcare goods and services did so more
often from a private person they do not know (75%), a known private person (37%) or
from a firm or business (28%). Analysing the reason for unknowingly buying undeclared
healthcare goods and services, those buying for a lower price did so more often from a
private person they do not know (73%), a known private person 41%) or from a firm or
business (31%). Similarly, and as Table 2 reveals, those buying unknowingly undeclared
healthcare goods and services did so more often from a private person they do not know
(66%), a firm or business (54%) or from public service providers (21%).
In order to evaluate the relationship between the propensity to buy undeclared health-
care goods and services and vertical and horizontal trust, Table 3 firstly displays the
socio-economic profile of the individuals more likely to buy such services. The results of
the logistic regressions evaluating undeclared healthcare goods and services overall (Model
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 11561 6 of 14
1 and Model 2), knowingly bought (Model 3) or unknowingly bought (Model 4) show that
no relationship could be identified with the socio-economic variables. No socio-economic
profiles of those buying undeclared healthcare goods and services (knowingly or unknow-
ingly) could be identified, meaning that buyers of this type of service could be found in
each socio-economic group. This is the case when solely the socio-economic variables are
included in the model evaluating undeclared healthcare goods and services without taking
other variables into account (Model 1), when vertical and horizontal trust variables are
added to the socio-economic variables while evaluating undeclared healthcare goods and
services irrespective of the reason of purchase (Model 2), or when broken down by knowing
reasons (Model 3) or unknowing reasons (Model 4) for buying such services (rejecting
the Hypothesis H1). As such, one cannot assert that this practice is more common in
some socio-economic groups than others even if previous studies identified a relationship
between the employment status and citizens self-assessed health [53]. However, this is
not the case when evaluating the relationship between the propensity to buy undeclared
healthcare goods and services and the country of residence or the vertical and horizontal
trust. Indeed, citizens in Malta, Cyprus and Greece are more likely to (knowingly) buy
undeclared healthcare goods and services than those in Italy (Models 2 and 3 in Table 3),
while only citizens in Malta are more likely to unknowingly buy undeclared healthcare
goods and services than those in Italy (Model 4 in Table 3).
By analysing the relationship between undeclared healthcare goods and services
and vertical trust (Model 2), a statistically significant negative association is revealed.
The higher the vertical trust (measured using tax morale), the lower is the propensity
to buy undeclared healthcare goods and services (confirming Hypothesis H2). There is
also a strong association between individuals buying undeclared healthcare goods and
services and their perceived estimation regarding the share of the population engaged
in undeclared activities (horizontal trust or trust in other citizens). Those perceiving a
larger share of citizens to be engaged in undeclared activities (i.e., perceiving it to be a
common practice in their country) are more likely to buy themselves undeclared healthcare
goods and services. This therefore confirms Hypothesis H3. Both H2 and H3 are further
confirmed when analysing the propensity to buy undeclared healthcare goods and services
as a knowing activity (Model 3). With larger coefficients, a strong association is revealed
between individuals knowingly buying undeclared healthcare goods and services and
their level of vertical and horizontal trust. Moreover, when patients consider that the
estimated share of the population engaged in undeclared activities is large (i.e., over 40%) it
is more likely (higher coefficients) that they, themselves, will (knowingly) buy undeclared
healthcare goods and services.
Even if vertical and horizontal trust should only play, by chance, a role in explaining
the unknowing acquisition of undeclared healthcare goods and services, Model 4 in Table 3
tests if this is the case. As expected, no statistically significant association was identified
in respect to vertical trust. By contrast, the perceived estimated share of the population
engaged in undeclared activities was identified as associated with unknowing purchases
of undeclared healthcare goods and services. However, with the findings in Table 3, one
cannot conclude that the higher the perceived estimated share of the population engaged
in undeclared activities, the higher is the likelihood to unknowingly buy undeclared
healthcare goods and services (i.e., the relationship is significant only for one level, namely
the perceived level of spread of 10–40%). Thus, even if effective in dealing with knowingly
buying undeclared healthcare goods and services, improving the levels of both vertical and
horizontal trust will not reduce the practice of unknowingly buying undeclared healthcare
goods and services. Other policy measures are needed in this regard, such as to encourage
proactive behaviour in asking for an invoice.
These results on vertical and horizontal trust are further supported by a robustness
analysis provided in Table 4. This reveals that the results are broadly the same for all
models (Model 2 to 4) regardless of if the logistic regressions are estimated with or without
sample weights or with imputed missing data.
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Woman −0.207 (0.151) −0.047 (0.157) −0.076 (0.196) −0.265 (0.266)
Age (exact) 0.002 (0.006) 0.004 (0.006) −0.006 (0.008) 0.013 (0.012)
Education (R: Up to 15 years old when stopped full time education)
16–19 0.007 (0.209) −0.050 (0.217) 0.093 (0.283) −0.531 (0.340)
20+ 0.184 (0.243) 0.100 (0.249) 0.189 (0.315) −0.467 (0.442)
Still Studying
(1) −1.064 * (0.622) −1.047 (0.640) −1.422 * (0.861) −0.773 (0.975)
Household composition, aged 15+ (R: One person)
Two −0.003 (0.219) −0.036 (0.227) −0.194 (0.271) −0.024 (0.383)
Three 0.228 (0.257) 0.180 (0.265) −0.176 (0.328) 0.360 (0.448)
Four or more 0.273 (0.265) 0.088 (0.274) −0.212 (0.331) 0.462 (0.461)
Employment status (R: Self-employed)
Employed −0.260 (0.248) −0.085 (0.259) −0.154 (0.301) −0.168 (0.532)
Not working −0.076 (0.261) 0.047 (0.275) 0.033 (0.321) −0.140 (0.556)
Financial difficulties (2) (R: Most of the time)
From time to
time
0.033 (0.211) 0.132 (0.218) 0.085 (0.254) 0.604 (0.487)
Almost
never/Never
−0.165 (0.236) −0.158 (0.243) −0.277 (0.294) −0.107 (0.511)
Country (R:
Italy)
Greece 1.041 *** (0.250) 1.166 *** (0.256) 1.420 *** (0.320) −0.729 (0.528)
Cyprus 1.345 *** (0.264) 1.615 *** (0.272) 1.675 *** (0.346) 0.702 (0.468)
Malta 1.834 *** (0.255) 2.550 *** (0.275) 2.121 *** (0.366) 2.664 *** (0.389)
Vertical and Horizontal Trust
Vertical Trust
(Tax morale)
−0.242 *** (0.038) −0.261 *** (0.044) 0.171 (0.121)
Horizontal Trust (estimated % of the population engaged in undeclared activities (R: Less than 10%))
10–40% 1.179 *** (0.265) 1.484 *** (0.382) 1.575 *** (0.482)
Over 40% 1.806 *** (0.289) 2.188 *** (0.401) 0.414 (0.637)
Do not know −0.423 (0.389) −0.482 (0.624) −1.541 * (0.854)
Constant −3.561 *** (0.554) −2.865 *** (0.656) −2.781 *** (0.812) −7.542 *** (1.533)
Observations 2882 2775 2775 2775
Log
likelihood
−705.16 −637.12 −442.96 −254.26
χ
2 78.73 198.54 139.49 173.89
p> 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: (1) and no full-time education; (2) in paying household bills; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; SE = Standard Errors (in parentheses).
Source: author’s estimations based on data extracted from Special Eurobarometer 498.
To graphically display the magnitude of the effect of each variable included in the
analysis on the likelihood to purchase (knowingly and unknowingly) undeclared healthcare
goods and services, Figure 1(a1–c1) displays the marginal effects and Figure 1(a2–c2) the
adjusted predicted probability by vertical and horizontal trust.
According to Figure 1(a1,b1), the country of residence, vertical and horizontal trust
have the largest effect in explaining the prevalence of (knowingly) undeclared healthcare
goods and services. Figure 1(a2,b2) further investigate the role of vertical and horizontal
trust in explaining the decision to (knowingly) buy undeclared healthcare goods and
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services by computing the predicted probability by these two variables. When having a
low level of vertical trust, the probability to (knowingly) purchase undeclared healthcare
goods and services is much higher than when having a high level of vertical trust. Similarly,
horizontal trust plays a central role in predicting (knowingly) undeclared healthcare goods
and services. As such, with low levels of horizontal trust (high perceived estimated percent
of the population engaged in undeclared activities), the probability to (knowingly) buy
undeclared healthcare goods and services is much higher. Moreover, Figure 1(a2,b2) clearly
display how improving either the level of vertical trust, either the level of horizontal trust
will significantly reduce the prevalence of (knowingly) undeclared healthcare goods and
services. Indeed, maximum results could be obtained with high levels of both vertical and
horizontal trust.














Horizontal Trust (Estimated %
Engaged in Undeclared Activities
































































































































Notes: (1) Multiple Imputations for data missing at random, Incomplete–Imputed: Undeclared healthcare goods and services (Total)—95,
Undeclared healthcare goods and services (Knowing)—95, Undeclared healthcare goods and services (Unknowing)—95, Education—41,
Financial difficulties—45, Vertical Trust—104, Horizontal Trust—50; (2) DK—Do not know; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Standard Errors
in parentheses. Source: author’s estimations based on data extracted from Special Eurobarometer 498.
Marginal effects and predicted probabilities by vertical and horizontal trust for
those unknowingly buying undeclared healthcare goods and services are displayed in
Figure 1(c1,c2). Beside country of residence, both figures reveal a single statistically signifi-
cant association between unknowingly undeclared healthcare goods and services and those
considering that the share of population engaged in undeclared activities is between 10 and
40%. However, according to Figure 1(c1,c2), its effect on the prevalence of unknowingly
undeclared healthcare goods and services is very small.
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Undeclared healthcare goods and services: Unknowing (Predicted probability), by Vertical and Horizontal Trust). Source: 
author`s estimations based on data extracted from Special Eurobarometer 498. Notes: predicted probability for a ‘repre-
sentative’ individual computed with the mean and mode of the socio-demographic variables: 49 years old woman, 16–19 
years old when stopped education, living in Italy in a 2 persons household, not working and facing financial difficulties 
from time to time 
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Knowing (Margi al effects); (b2) Undeclared healthcare goods and services: Knowing (Predicted probability), by Verti al
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healthcare goods and services: Unknowing (Predicted probability), by Vertical and Horizontal Trust). Source: author‘s
estimations based on data extracted from Special Eurobarometer 498. Notes: predicted probability for a ‘representative’
individual computed with the mean and mode of the socio-demographic variables: 49 years old woman, 16–19 years old
when stopped education, living in Italy in a 2 persons household, not working and facing financial difficulties from time
to time.
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4. Discussion
This paper has explored the purchase of healthcare undeclared goods and services in
four member states of the European Union from Southern Europe, namely Cyprus, Greece,
Italy and Malta. The finding is that 13% of citizens in Malta, 9% in Cyprus, 7% in Greece
and 2% in Italy purchased undeclared goods and services from healthcare sector in the past
12 months prior to survey. However, considering that not all the respondents to the survey
needed healthcare or visited a hospital or a clinic in the year prior to survey, these figures
need to be seen as lower bound estimates. Variations exist when investigating whether
the purchase was knowing or unknowing (i.e., the purchase realizing that they have made
a purchase from the informal economy only afterwards, because they have not received
an invoice or a receipt). Out of those buying undeclared healthcare goods and services in
Greece, 80% did so knowingly and only 9% unknowingly. Similarly, in Cyprus, 65% did
so knowingly and only 20% unknowingly. In sharp contrast, only 41% of those buying
undeclared healthcare goods and services in Malta did so knowingly and 67% unknowingly.
Undeclared healthcare goods and services are bought more frequently from private persons
(other than those close to the patient; 71% of those buying undeclared healthcare goods and
services), firms or businesses in the health sector (35%), known private persons (e.g., friends,
neighbours, colleagues, relatives; 27%) and public service providers (16%). However, those
buying unknowingly undeclared healthcare goods and services did so more often from
public service providers (21%) than those making a knowing decision, displaying the
fact that using the public office for private gain by the medical staff is rather extensive.
However, no significant differences between the socio-demographic characteristics of those
purchasing healthcare undeclared goods and services on a knowing basis and those making
such purchases on an unknowing basis have been identified. As such, the finding is that
when analysing the demand-side of the informal economy there is no similar dual informal
labour market divide, as is the case for the supply side of the informal economy.
Nevertheless, a strong association between the likelihood to purchase healthcare
undeclared goods and services and the level of trust (in government and between citizens)
displayed by citizens has been identified. Important to mention however is that this
association has been identified only for knowing purchases from the informal economy.
This has important policy implications for tackling this phenomenon which negatively
impact the resource allocation in healthcare, healthcare access and quality and patient
rights and protection. As such, different policy approaches are required to address the
two groups of purchasers. Those who unknowingly made such purchases should be
encouraged to act legitimately using policy initiatives that encourage them to ask for a
receipt for all services. Such examples include, for instance, receipts lotteries or service
vouchers [54,55]. Indeed, considering that 71% of those purchasing undeclared healthcare
goods and services made these purchases from private persons, other than those close to
the patient, a scheme of vouchers that would allow them to employ private persons for
specific goods or services could be effective in reducing the prevalence of this practice.
Other effective policies might also include the introduction of certified cash registers across
all health services accompanied by adverts and posters informing citizens that unless they
receive a printed receipt, they are not obliged to pay for any bills received and can make
a complaint at a certain hyperlink. This would require the development of a complaint
reporting tool by the national health services where requests for informal payments can be
reported. Meanwhile, for those who knowingly make such purchases, a wider range of
policy initiatives are necessary. Firstly, regardless of the reasons that made them purchase
undeclared healthcare goods and services (i.e., lower price, faster or better service, social
ends or lack of availability on the formal market), an array of policies aimed at fostering
trust are necessary. On the one hand, this can entail governments using education and
awareness raising campaigns which highlight the benefits of operating in the formal
economy. On the other hand, however, this can also entail governments nurturing the
trust of citizens by improving the quality of governance [56,57], procedural justice [58,59],
procedural fairness [60] and redistributive justice [61]. Third and finally, this article reveals
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the need to improve the horizontal trust of citizens that other citizens operate in a compliant
manner and do not buy undeclared goods and services. This might include not publicizing
the high levels of non-compliance, which reduces horizontal trust, and instead targets
communications to citizens on the very high level of overall compliance, both of their peer
group (e.g., in their sector, locality) and the wider society [62].
5. Conclusions
This paper is the first study to investigate how both types of trust (i.e., between citizens
and the government and between the citizens) influence the purchase of undeclared goods
and services, taking as a case study the healthcare sector. The findings show that trust is
significantly associated with the greater likelihood to purchase undeclared healthcare goods
and services if the decision to make a purchase from the informal economy is knowing.
For the unknowing purchases, no straightforward relationship has been identified. This
paper was unable, however, to look deeper at the link between the purchase of undeclared
healthcare goods and services and other informal practices prevalent in the healthcare
sector, such as the informal payments made by patients to the healthcare practitioners. It
would be important to explore, especially for the unknowing purchases, whether the use of
public office for private gain (i.e., selling healthcare goods and services without registering
them) is related or not with the informal payments. It might be the case that, the same
medical staff require an informal payment for providing goods or services to the patients
in need, which is also undeclared, being as such involved in multiple illegal activities. This
could involve qualitative research to explore in greater depth the reasons and motives of
patients and medical staff involved in the purchase of undeclared goods and services.
Furthermore, this study is conducted on a narrow range of Southern European coun-
tries. Whether similar findings are identified when a wider range of countries and global
regions are evaluated now needs further research. The current methodology could be
replicated in these other countries and global regions to evaluate whether this is the case.
Whether these findings are valid when other sectors or other regions are investigated needs
to be explored in further studies.
If this study now encourages further studies in a wider range of countries and global
regions, then it will have fulfilled one of its intentions. If it also encourages governments in
general, and health service authorities more particularly, to start to experiment with the
above suggested policy initiatives to improve vertical and horizontal trust, then it will have
fulfilled its wider intention.
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